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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Steven Reid Briggs entered in a conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under
the influence (hereinafter, DUI), preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw conducted upon him. The district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Briggs. On
appeal, Mr. Briggs asserts that the district court erred in denying Mr. Briggs' motion to
suppress the results of his forcible blood draw.

As such, Mr. Briggs' respectfully

requests that this Court modify or overrule State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P .3d 739
(2007) for the reasons articulated herein.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 1, 2008, Officer Joshua Deede 1 while working as private security
for the Colonial Theater observed a vehicle that was attempting to exit the parking lot,
come into contact with "the chain that divides the parking lot with the pedestrian
sidewalk" and drive up onto the sidewalk.

(Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.17-25, p.9, Ls.1-20.)2

Officer Deede asked for assistance because he was not officially on duty at that time.
(Prelim. Tr., p.11, Ls.16-23.)

Officer Lynn Case responded and testified that upon

arriving at the scene, "Mr. Briggs was in the back seat of Officer Miller's car
handcuffed." (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.6-22.)

Officer Case testified "While he was busy

swearing at me and insulting me, I noticed that his speech was slurred. He was loud

1

Officer Deede was employed by the City of Idaho Falls. (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.20-22.)
The 12/19/10 transcript of Mr. Briggs' preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim.
Tr.," for ease of reference.
2

1

and sloppy in his speech and movements.

Very strong odor of alcoholic beverage,

bloodshot glassy eyes, and he had urinated in his pants." (Prelim Tr., p.17, Ls.4-16.)
Mr. Briggs "vehemently" refused to exit the vehicle and would not respond when asked
if he would take a breath test. (Prelim. Tr., p.17, L.20 - p.18, L.18.) Officer Case then
advised Mr. Briggs that he would be taken for a blood draw. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.1416.)
Officer Case testified as to Mr. Briggs' conduct while sitting in the back of the
patrol car after being informed he would be taken for a blood draw:
He wouldn't sit back in the seat. Laid there on the seat kicking at
us. We were able to catch his legs. He wouldn't fold them up so we could
close the door. I eventually had to hit him in the back of the knee to get
that leg to fold up, and we got that done, but as soon as I closed the door,
he pushed off of that door, stuck his head and shoulders off out the other
door and now the fight is on to try to get that door closed. Absolutely
refused to cooperate, just screaming, yelling, cussing, swearing. We
eventually managed to get him sitting up enough to close the door and
transported him to the EIRMC.
(Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Once officers arrived got to EIRMC, Mr. Briggs "refused to
exit the vehicle. We had to actually pull him out and put him face down on a gurney to
get him inside the hospital for the blood draw." (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Officer
Case testified that Mr. Briggs' "cussing and swearing and threatening continued, along
with sexual innuendos about our mothers and our sisters." (Prelim. Tr., p.20, Ls.1-3.)
Ultimately, once the phlebotomist arrived, "Mr. Briggs had to be held down by several
officers for the blood draw to be done." 3 (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10.)

3

According to the arguments made by both the State and defense counsel, it appears
as though it took five officers to hold Mr. Briggs down to conduct the forcible blood draw.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.2-5, p.14, Ls.24-25.)
2

Mr. Briggs was charged by Information with felony DUI, wherein the State alleged
that Mr. Briggs had been convicted of two prior DUl's within the previous ten years.
(R., pp.17-19.) Defense counsel for Mr. Briggs filed a motion to suppress, arguing the
results of the forcible blood draw conducted upon him following his arrest for suspicion
of DUI should be suppressed because the blood draw was not permitted by Idaho
statutory authority and was conducted in an excessive manner. (R., pp.28-29.) The
State filed a response and the district court entered an order denying Mr. Briggs
suppression motion. (R., pp.36-38, 43.) Mr. Briggs then entered a conditional plea of
guilty to felony DUI, specifically preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial
of his suppression motion. (R., pp.51-52; Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.4.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Briggs.
(R., pp.58-61.)

Mr. Briggs filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's

Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.61-63.)

3

ISSUES
1)

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the results
of the forcible blood draw because the forcible blood draw violated his fourth
amendment rights as outlined in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)?

2)

Assuming Schmerber permits nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in simple
DUI offenses not involving an injury or accident, did the district court err denying
the motion to suppress where the State failed to prove exigent circumstances
justified subverting the warrant requirement in Mr. Briggs' case?

3)

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the results
of the forcible blood draw because it was unreasonable under the
circumstances?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Briggs' Motion To Suppress The Results Of The
Forcible Blood Draw Because The Forcible Blood Draw Violated His Fourth Amendment
Rights As Outlined In Schmerber

A.

Introduction
Mr. Briggs asserts that the district court erred denying his suppression motion

because the forcible blood draw violated his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures as outlined in Schmerber.

B.

The Fourth Amendment Protects Individuals From Unreasonable Forcible Blood
Draws
Neither this Court through broad interpretation, nor the State through legislative

enactments, can reduce or rescind the minimal, basic, and fundamental protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens, irrespective of their
domicile, by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ybarra v.
11/inois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) (state statute which purports to authorize police in

some circumstances to make searches and seizures without probable cause and
without search warrants falls within the category of statutes "purporting to authorize
searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches.").
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people, not
places, from unwarranted governmental intrusions. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
96 n.5 (1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); State v. Pruss, 145
Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008).

5

Fourth Amendment protections are

secured by the constitutional requirement that all searches and seizures be reasonable.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a
specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863,
934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997). When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred,
the State bears a heavy burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement.

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225,
869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993).
It is without question that "[t]he taking of a blood alcohol content test is a seizure
within the context of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution." State v.

Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989) (citations omitted) As the
United States Supreme Court recognized in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966):
It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent does not argue,
that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures
of 'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment.
384 U.S. at 767.

C.

The United States Supreme Court Recognizes That The Fourth Amendment
Protects Individuals From Unreasonable Forcible Blood Draws

Schmerber was only the second case to be considered by the United States
Supreme Court on the question of whether forcible blood draws violate an individual's
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, but it was
also the last. In the first case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-440 (1957), the

6

petitioner was driving a truck that collided with a passenger car, killing all three
occupants of the car and seriously injuring the petitioner. Id. at 433. Officers found a
nearly empty whiskey bottle in the glove compartment of the petitioner's truck, and the
smell of alcohol was detected on the petitioner's breath at the hospital.

Id.

The

petitioner's blood was drawn by a physician, at the request of a police officer, while the
petitioner was unconscious and results revealed the petitioner's blood alcohol content to
be .17. Id. The petitioner challenged the admission of the blood test results at his trial,
arguing the blood draw was involuntary and violated his Due Process rights. Id. The
United States Supreme Court held that blood test results were admissible in the
petitioner's involuntary manslaughter prosecution because New Mexico had validly
declined to adopt the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations.

Id. at 439-

440. In determining that the blood draw was not offensive to due process, the Court
emphasized the fact that the blood was drawn under the protective eye of the physician,
and not done in a manner that would shock the conscience or be considered a method
of obtaining evidence that would offend a sense of justice. Id. at 438.
Subsequently, the Court directly addressed the blood draw as a Fourth
Amendment issue. In Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at
a bar at a bowling alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car
which the petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Id. Both
the petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment. 4

4

While this incident was charged as misdemeanor driving under the influence of
alcohol, it should be noted that the offense occurred in 1964 and there is no indication
that state law, at the time, included a more serious offense of causing an accident or
injury while DUI. Of course, the underlying facts of the offense in Schmerber are more
serious than a simple misdemeanor DUI.
7

Id. At the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the

petitioner.

Id. at 758.

The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the

petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at
petitioner's trial.

Id. at 759.

The petitioner objected to the admission of the results,

arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id.
The Schmerber Court found no violation stemming from the warrantless taking of
the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case. Specifically, the Court relied on
the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in the exigency determination
under the following circumstances: the officer investigating the accident encountered
the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of alcohol; the passenger in
defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the investigating officer arrived at
the hospital where defendant was being treated almost two hours after the accident;
and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The Schmerber Court, without citing
to any authority, stated:

We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to
eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt
to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 5
5

It is important to remember that Schmerber was decided in 1966. More than 40 years
have passed since the decision, and technology in the scientific and medical fields has
advanced exponentially. While the court in 1966 may have been justified in relying
upon the destruction of blood evidence as a factor in the exigent circumstance analysis
excusing the warrant requirement, the state of technology, advancements in medical
and scientific technology over the past 40 years vitiate the propriety of such a strenuous
reliance.
8

Before broadly applying the analysis of Schmerber to any other case or facts,
however, it is important to remember the Court's final admonition:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on
the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is
a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. (emphasis added).

D.

The Idaho Supreme Court Case Law Comported With The Limitations The
United States Supreme Court Placed On Forcible Blood Draws Until It Issued
Diaz. And To The Extent Diaz Does Not Comport With The Fourth Amendment
Or Schmerber. It Should Be Modified Or Overruled
Since Schmerber was issued in 1966, Idaho courts have struggled to identify

limits on the scope of forcible evidentiary testing in DUI prosecutions and driver license
suspension hearings. The Idaho Supreme Court appears to have first addressed the
ability of an individual to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration
in the context of driver's license revocation matter. See State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1,
704 P.2d 333 (1985). In Ankney, the defendant argued that he had shown cause for
refusing to take the evidentiary test when he testified that he did not know whether he
had a constitutional right to refuse the test and he did not understand the refusal form
that was read to him. Id. at 3, 704 P.2d at 335. As a result, the defendant argued that
his driver's license should not have been suspended because of his refusal to submit to
an evidentiary test.

The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "[u]nder

Ankney's reading of the statute, any justification for not taking the test would be
sufficient to excuse a person from the test. This interpretation is contrary to both good
sense and the rules of statutory construction." Id. at 6, 704 P.2d at 338.

9

A few months later, in State v. Tierney, 109 Idaho 474, 708 P.2d 879 (1985), the
Idaho Supreme Court again considered the right to refuse evidentiary testing for alcohol
in the context of a driver's license suspension.

In Tierney, the defendant refused to

submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration and a result, his driver's license
was seized and suspended. Id. at 476, 708 P.2d at 881. The defendant challenged his
license suspension, and the court held a hearing at which the defendant testified that he
declined the test because (1) he was intoxicated, and (2) he was on medications he
believed might affect the outcome of the test. Id. The defendant's testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend and an acquaintance.

Id. at 447, 708

P.2d at 882. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant's
"justifications for refusing to submit to the test do not constitute 'cause' for refusal to
submit to the test." Id. (citing Ankney, 109 Idaho at 1, 704 P.2d at 333).
The Idaho Supreme Court next considered the ability of an individual to refuse to
submit to a blood-alcohol test, again in the civil context, in In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,
744 P.2d 92 (1987). In Griffiths, the defendant's driver's license was suspended based
on his refusal to take a test to determine his blood alcohol content. Id. at 365, 744 P.2d
at 93. The defendant appealed the suspension to the magistrate court, which held a
hearing and considered testimony from police officers, including the arresting officer, the
defendant, and the defendant's mother.

Id. at 366-367, 744 P.2d at 94-95.

The

defendant and his mother both testified that he had a fear of needles, and the defendant
testified that was the reason he refused to submit to the blood draw. Id. The magistrate
found that fear of needles was not, as a matter of law, reason to refuse a blood-alcohol
test. Id. at 367, 744 P.2d at 95. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a fear of

10

needles may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to a blood test requested
pursuant to I.C. §18-8002 if the fear is of such a magnitude that as a practical matter the
defendant is psychologically unable to submit to the test, and if the fear is sufficiently
articulated to the police officer at the time of the refusal so that the officer is given an
opportunity to request a different test."

Id. at 372, 744 P.2d at 100.

Notably, the

Griffiths Court acknowledged that the language of I.C. § 18-8002(3), formerly codified

as I.C. §49-352, which allowed a defendant to show cause why he or she refused an
evidentiary test, "had meaning in and of itself, and by itself established grounds for
refusal." Id. The Court further noted that "[i]t seems self-evident that the legislature has
authorized the seizure of a license only where the defendant has refused a requested
test after being properly informed." Id. In sum, the Griffiths Court recognized the ability
of a driver to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol content.
It was not until 1989, that the Court addressed a defendant's ability to refuse to
submit to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol content in the criminal context.

See

State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In Woolery, the defendant was

driving a truck at a high rate of speed through an intersection and failed to stop at the
stop sign. Id. The defendant's vehicle crashed into the victim's car, killing the victim's
passenger and seriously injuring the victim. Id. The defendant suffered head and chest
injuries and was transported to Mercy Medical Center for treatment.

Id. at 369, 775

P.2d at 1211. An officer at the scene followed the ambulance to Mercy Medical Center
and told the defendant's treating physician that he needed a blood test sample from the
defendant. Id. The sample was drawn and revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol
content was over the legal limit. Id. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the

11

test results, arguing that he did not consent to the blood test. Id. at 370, 775 P.2d at
1212.
At a hearing, the State stipulated that the defendant was not provided with the
advisory rights contained in I.C. §18-8002 when his blood was drawn, and the testimony
of the officer established the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the blood
draw. Id. The lower court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that: "[i]n the instant situation, the destruction of
the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency which
justifies the warrantless search." Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the relevant
questions were whether there was sufficient justification for ordering the testing, and
whether the test was conducted in a reasonable manner. Id. at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213.
The legislature acknowledged [in I.C. § 18-8002] that some individuals
refuse to comply with their previously granted [implied] consent to submit
to an evidentiary test. Rather than condone a physical conflict, the
legislature provided for the administrative revocation of the license
of an individual who refuses to comply with his previously given
consent. Such legislative acknowledgement was not meant to hamstring
the ability of law enforcement to properly investigate and obtain evidence
of serious crimes committed by those individuals who have chosen
to drink and drive.

For the driver who has been involved in an accident which causes either
serious injury or death, the state must have the usual authority to
investigate and collect evidence which exists in any other felony
investigation. Thus, a driver's refusal to peacefully submit to an
evidentiary test should not preclude law enforcement from making a
probable cause seizure of his blood.
Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis added).

In State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682 (1990), the Idaho
Supreme Court considered a challenge to applicability of I.C. § 18-8002 on Indian
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reservations. In considering the jurisdictional issue, the Court also considered whether
the breath alcohol tests were admissible against the defendants. The defendants had
voluntarily submitted to the tests after being advised that the failure to do so would
result in a 180 day driver's license suspension. Id. at 1010, 793. P.2d at 683.

In

addressing the implied consent provision, the Court noted that "[a]lthough under
I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary
test, that section did not create statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent
or refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level." Id. at
1013-1014, 793 P.2d at 686-687 (citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 368, 775 P.2d at 1210).
Both Griffith and Woolery comported with United States Supreme Court precedent and
the United States Constitution.
Subsequent appellate cases addressing refusals to submit to evidentiary testing
for blood alcohol content arose in the context of simple driving under the influence of
alcohol charges not involving accidents, or in license revocation proceedings. See, e.g.,
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999) (defendant charged

with DUI first refused and then consented to breath test only after being ordered to do
so by his parole officer; consent was not involuntary and results were admissible
because the defendant had impliedly consented to such testing by driving a car on
Idaho highways, and "although an individual has the physical ability to prevent a test,
there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent."); State v. Halen, 136
Idaho 829, 41 P .3d 257 (2002) (affirming driver's license suspension based on driver's
refusal to submit to blood draw based on dislike for needles, where driver's dislike of
needles did not constitute a "psychological inability to submit to the [blood] test" and did
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not demonstrate cause for refusing test); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d
211 (Ct. App. 2002) (warrantless forcible blood draw of defendant charged with felony
DUI, where three officers and two nurses held defendant down, and physical restraints
were used to accomplish forcible blood draw, not violative of Fourth Amendment due to
exigent circumstances or implied consent, and draw not unreasonable).
In 2007, despite the clear constitutional standards adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Griffiths and Woolery, which were based on Schmerber and
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned those
standards in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). In Diaz, the defendant
was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and was transported by the
officer to a local hospital where his blood was drawn. Id. at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. The
defendant did not physically resist either being transported to the hospital, or the taking
of his blood, but protested the blood draw. Id. The Defendant was ultimately charged
with felony DUI based on prior convictions, and he sought to suppress his blood test
results, arguing that the test was involuntary and not justified by exigent circumstances.

Id.
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent. Id. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160
P.3d at 471.

Because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary

testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at
303, 160 P.3d at 742.

Given the Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was

consensual, the Court went on to consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under
the Fourth Amendment, in light of the totality of the circumstances including:
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(1)

whether the procedure was done in a medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the
procedure was done without unreasonable force.

Id.

Finding the blood draw to be

reasonable, the Court then considered whether I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to
order involuntary blood draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular
manslaughter. The Court found that the statute provides NO protection to drivers, but
only to hospital professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may
request, rather than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the
driver's will. Id. at 303-304, 160 P.3d at 742-743.
The Court's decision in Diaz is contrary to Schmerber, its own precedent (see

Griffiths; Woolery), and it renders portions of Idaho Code irrelevant and superfluous. It
is not disputed that in Idaho, as is true in every other state, by driving a motor vehicle on
the roadways (or in some jurisdictions, by obtaining a driver's license), a driver consents
to evidentiary testing of his or her blood, breath and urine for the presence of alcohol or
intoxicating substances, when an officer has reasonable grounds, or probable cause, to
believe the driver is intoxicated.

See Idaho Code §§ 18-8002(1 ), -8002A(e); M.

Elizabeth Fuller, Comment, Implied Consent Statutes: What is Refusal?, 9 AM. J. OF
TRIAL Aovoc. 423,424 FN.12 (1986) (identifying and citing to implied consent statutes in
every state).
In exchange for the privilege of driving on the roadways of a given state, or in
exchange for the privilege of a driver's license, a driver impliedly consents to submit to
evidentiary testing so long as that testing is legally justified. Id. Despite the existence
of implied consent laws, the vast majority of states have nevertheless found that an
individual may refuse to submit to evidentiary testing, so long as they are advised that
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the failure to submit to testing will result in a civil penalty and driver's license
suspension. See, e.g., Pena, v. State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984) (chemical sobriety
test results inadmissible in manslaughter prosecution of defendant who refused to take
test); State v. Estrada, 100 P.3d 452 (Ariz. Ct. Ap. Div. 2 2004) (blood test results in DUI
prosecution inadmissible when blood drawn without warrant while defendant received
medical treatment against his will); State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Appl.
3d Dist. 1995) (blood test results inadmissible in DUI prosecution where driver
consented to blood draw only after being misinformed by officer that statute required
him to submit to test, rather than telling driver that driver could submit to test);
Pilkenton v. State, 561 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (in DUI prosecution, evidence

insufficient to invoke implied consent statute allowing officers to require driver to submit
to blood test where there is an accident involving serious injury, where driver
complained of pain in wrist and other driver was bleeding but not seriously injured);
Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (implied consent laws could not

be applied in DUI causing death where officer requesting medical personnel draw
defendant's blood did not advise defendant of implied consent law and did not seek
defendant's actual consent); People v. Wade, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 1983) (under
implied consent law if officer has reasonable grounds to believe driver is DUI, officer
may have a blood sample withdrawn by appropriate professional within two hours of
arrest for results to be admissible but officer MUST honor conscious suspect's wish to
refuse test); State v. Shantie, 92 P.3d 746 (Ore. 2004) (defendant's refusal to consent
to blood draw did not render blood draw results inadmissible in DUI trial under implied
consent law where the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant); State v. Mullins,
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489 S.E. 2d 923 (S.C. 1997) (under implied consent statute, once driver refused blood
tests, no chemical tests could be performed and results were inadmissible in DUI trial);
Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (implied consent statute did

not preclude taking of blood sample pursuant to search warrant and thus results were
admissible in DUI prosecution even where driver did not consent; implied consent
statute did not provide greater protection than fourth amendment).
Indeed, both Idaho Code and case law recognize that individuals will refuse to
submit to evidentiary testing. See Idaho Code §18-8002(3) ("At the time evidentiary
testing ... is requested, the person shall be informed that if he refuses to submit to or if
he fails to complete, evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8002(4) ("If the motorist refuses
to submit to or complete evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8002A(2) ("At the time of
evidentiary testing ... is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person
refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8004(2)
("Any person who does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration or whose test
result is determined by the court to be unreliable or inadmissible against him .... ");
Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 370, 744 P.2d at 98.; but see State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-

303, 160 P.3d 739, 741-742 (2007) (holding that pursuant to I.C. §18-8002(1), by
driving a vehicle, the defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol
and could not withdraw that consent); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257,
261 (2002) (same in the context of a driver's license suspension challenge where
defendant refused and did not submit to an alcohol concentration test); State v.
Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 475, 65 P.3d 211, 216 (Ct. App 2002) ("[The defendant],
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by virtue of the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement and Idaho's
implied consent statute, had no legal entitlement to refuse or prevent the blood draw.").
The only circumstances under which an officer is permitted to require a driver,
against his or her will, to submit to evidentiary testing is when the officer has probable
cause to believe the driver has committed one of the following offenses: (1) aggravated
DUI; (2) vehicular manslaughter where the driver is under the influence; (3) aggravated
operation of a vessel on the waters of Idaho while the operator is under the influence;
and (4) criminal homicide involving a vessel on the waters of Idaho while the operator is
under the influence. See Idaho Code§ 18-8002(6)(b); but see Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303304, 160 P.3d at 742-743 (holding that I.C. §18-8002(6)(b) applies and protects medical
personnel only, and limits when an officer may order medical personnel to administer a
blood withdrawal, not when an officer can request a blood draw). An officer is permitted
to compel evidentiary testing under these enumerated circumstances just as he or she
would be able to do in any other serious felony case. Where an officer has probable
cause to believe that one of these "serious crimes [has been] committed by those
individuals who have chosen to drink and drive[,]" and the driver has "been involved

in an accident which causes either serious injury or death, the state must have the usual
authority to investigate and collect evidence which exists in any other felony
investigation." Woolery, 116 Idaho at Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis
added).

Thus, the ability of an officer to obtain a blood sample without the express

consent of a driver, and indeed in the face of the withdrawal of any implied consent, is
not contingent on the implied consent statute, but rather, hinges on traditional notions of
probable cause and warrant exceptions.
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The Diaz Court was simply incorrect in concluding that forcing a defendant to
submit to a blood draw over his objection could be justified by reliance on the implied
consent law. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 471. It is not true that because the
defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho
road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw."

Id. at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. In

reaching its conclusions, the Diaz Court makes the fundamental mistake of conflating
the concepts of exigent circumstances and consent.

1. Exigent Circumstances Excuse The Warrant Requirement But Do Not Excuse
The Probable Cause Requirement
An exigent circumstance is one in which "the facts known at the time of the
[warrantless] entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant."' 6 State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485-486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197-1198 (2007)
(quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). When a warrantless search is
justified on the basis of exigent circumstances, the search must also be justified by
probable cause. State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) ("The
exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to fact patterns sufficient to excuse an
officer form the requirement of obtaining a warrant to conduct a search for which he has

6

The availability of the telephonic warrant is certainly a factor that must be considered
in determining whether the circumstances are exigent, i.e., whether officers have time to
secure a warrant. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 778-780 (Utah 2007).
See United States v. Baker, 520 F.Supp. 1080, 1083 (D.lowa 1981) (finding that one
hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant time" to obtain warrant by telephone, a process
that often takes no more than thirty minutes); State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 131
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he Mesa Police Department is able to obtain a warrant within
as little as fifteen minutes and that delays of only fifteen to forty-five minutes are
commonplace."). "The mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency."
Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131.
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probable cause." (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).

The scope of a

warrantless entry or search premised on probable cause and exigent circumstances is
limited by the exigency that justified the warrantless entry or search at the outset. Id. at
487, 163 P.3d at 1199 (citations omitted).

The dissipation of blood alcohol is not

sufficient in and of itself to constitute exigent circumstances. 7

See, e.g., State v.

Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007).

2. Voluntary Consent Obviates The Need For Probable Cause
In contrast, consent is an exception to the probable cause requirement, and thus
an exception to the warrant requirement.
(1973).

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218

An officer need not possess probable cause, reasonable suspension, or

anything more than a hunch before asking a citizen whether he or she will consent to
search of their person or property. Of course, an individual always has the right to say

7

The dissipation of alcohol from the human body is accomplished at somewhere
between the rate of .015% and.018% per hour; although in some individuals the rate
may be as high as .022%. See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 280 (5th ed. 1995). Following the drawing of a blood sample, any
subsequent testing will reflect the blood alcohol content level at the time of the blood
draw, but not the level at the time of operation of a motor vehicle. See DAVID R. HARPER
& JANET E.l. CORRY, COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF SPECIMENS FOR ALCOHOL ANALYSIS, IN
MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF ALCOHOL DETERMINATION IN BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS 145, 149
(James C. Garriott ed. 1993). Fairly simple scientific formulae, known as retrograde
extrapolation, are employed to convert blood alcohol content results from the time of the
blood draw to the time of actual physical control over a motor vehicle. LAWRENCE
TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE§ 8.01 (4th ed. 1996). According even to conservative
estimates, given our knowledge of alcohol dissipation, there exists at least a 3.6 hour
window of opportunity during which a search warrant can be obtained to obtain a blood
sample for forensic testing without affecting the integrity of blood alcohol content results.
Id. § 6.02; see also 49 C.F.R. § 382.209 (1995) (Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations prohibit drivers who may be required to take a post-accident alcohol test
from consuming any alcohol for eight hours after an accident, or until the test is
conducted, whichever is sooner.).
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no. To be valid, consent must be given voluntarily. Smith, 144 Idaho at 488, 163 P.3d
at 1200.

Voluntariness is "a question of fact to be determined in light of all the

surrounding circumstances."

Id.

In addition, if a person consents to a search, the

scope of the consensual "search is generally defined by its expressed object[,]" or by
limits placed upon the scope of the search by the consenting party. Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of
the search to which he consents.").
In addition to being limited, consent may also be withdrawn. United States v.
Mcweeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9 th Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a suspect is free ... after

initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent at anytime," in the
context of a stop and risk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8 th Cir. 2005)
("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v. Lockett, 406
F.3d 907 (3 rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to revoke his
consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281
(1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. BustillosMunoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10 th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle search); United
States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4 th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context of a luggage

search).

Thus, the scope of a consensual search under the Fourth Amendment is

determined by standards of objective reasonableness: "what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?" Id.
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a. Consensual Searches Must Be Reasonable
Where the State seeks to rely upon voluntary implied consent to support forced
blood draws under the Fourth Amendment, the State bears the burden not only that the
consent was voluntary, but that the search conducted falls within the parameters or
limits of the consent given.

Thereafter, assuming the implied consent was voluntary

and the search was limited to the scope of the consent given, and not otherwise
withdrawn, the State must further demonstrate the search was reasonable.

Jimeno,

500 U.S. at 250 ('The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."); Diaz,
144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742.
The voluntariness and scope of the consent along with the reasonableness of the
search must be evaluated in light of the fact that a State cannot condition the granting of
a privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to due process. See

S/ochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (striking down statute
which made the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a city employee
or agent relating to his or her official duties the functional equivalent of a resignation,
where statute resulted in conclusive presumption of guilt of one who claimed his or her
constitutional privilege, such discharge violated due process even though employee had
no constitutional right to be a City employee).
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the
citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an
act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state
threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the
proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the
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relinquishment of constitutional rights.
surrender of one constitutional right as a
like manner, compel a surrender of all. It
embedded in the Constitution of the
manipulated out of existence.

If the state may compel the
condition of its favor, it may, in
is inconceivable that guaranties
United States may thus be

Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-594 (1926).
Here, the statute purporting to authorize warrantless, forcible blood draws based
on implied consent granted by the driver in exchange for the privilege of driving on
Idaho's roadways, and this Court's interpretation to the same effect, are precisely the
type of compulsion rejected by the United States Supreme Court. "If the State may
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may be manipulated out of existence." Id. Compelled
consent to warrantless searches of one's body as a condition of driving a car is
unreasonable and a violation of due process, which cannot be countenanced.
Moreover, a forcible blood draw like the one conducted here in reliance on
"implied consent" is unreasonable and violates due process because it involves the
State obtaining evidence from an individual by violating an individual's most cherished
right to autonomy and privacy in his or her own skin. It does so in a nonconsensual,
forcible manner that offends not only a sense of justice, but which "shocks the
conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1952). "So here, to sanction
the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose
judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be
more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society." Id. at
174; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (forcing defendant to undergo
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surgery so state could recover a bullet that was evidence in the defendant's felony
prosecution would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). Thus, a
forced blood draw based on "implied consent" is unreasonable in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

E.

In Conclusion. Mr. Briggs' Forcible Blood Test Results Should Have Been
Suppressed Because The Constitutional Protections Outlined By Schmerber Did
Not Exist In This Case And, Therefore, The Test Violated The Fourth
Amendment
In summary, under Schmerber, a warrantless blood draw is constitutionally

permissible only where an officer has probable cause to believe an individual involved in
an injury accident was under the influence of alcohol, and the officer has no time to
obtain a warrant to seize the quickly dissipating evidence. Mr. Briggs' case involves a
simple DUI without an injury accident. He revoked his implied consent and the forcible
removal of his blood was not taken voluntary. Moreover, as will be further explained in
section II, and incorporated herein as if fully argued, no exigent circumstances existed
that excuse the requirement to obtain a warrant. Thus, under Schmerber, Mr. Briggs'
warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment.

II.
Assuming Schmerber Permits Nonconsensual, Warrantless Blood Draws In Simple DUI
Offenses Not Involving An Injury Or Accident. The State Failed To Prove Exigent
Circumstances Justified Subverting The Warrant Requirement In Mr. Briggs' Case

A.

Introduction
When Mr. Briggs refused Officer Case's requests to submit first to a breath test

and then to a blood draw, five officers held him down and forcibly drew his blood. The
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officers did not have a warrant permitting the seizure of Mr. Briggs' blood, and the State
offered no evidence demonstrating the officers made any attempt to obtain one.

In

addition, the State failed to present any evidence that the warrantless blood draw was
justified by exigent circumstances. As a result, the warrantless seizure of Mr. Briggs'
blood was unconstitutional and the results must be suppressed.

B.

The State Failed To Demonstrate Exigent Circumstances Justified Dispensing
With The Warrant Requirement
Assuming Schmerber applies to simple DUI offenses which do not involve an

injury or accident, like the one with which Mr. Briggs was charged, and further assuming
Officer Case had probable cause to arrest Mr. Briggs for driving under the influence, the
State still bore the burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
blood draw. An exigent circumstance is one in which "the facts known at the time of the
[warrantless] entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant."' State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485-486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197-1198 (2007)
(quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)); State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501,
504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) ("The exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to
fact patterns sufficient to excuse an officer from the requirement of obtaining a warrant
to conduct a search for which he has probable cause." (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted)). The scope of a warrantless entry or search premised on probable
cause and exigent circumstances is limited by the exigency that justified the warrantless
entry or search at the outset.

Smith, 144 Idaho at 487, 163 P.3d at 1199 (citations
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omitted). The dissipation of blood alcohol is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute
exigent circumstances. 8 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007).
Here, Mr. Briggs was seized after an off duty officer observed Mr. Briggs' vehicle
come into contact with "the chain that divides the parking lot with the pedestrian
sidewalk" and drive up onto the sidewalk.

(Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.17-25, p.9, Ls.1-20.) 9

Officer Case, the responding officer, testified that Mr. Briggs' "speech was slurred. He
was loud and sloppy in his speech and movements.

Very strong odor of alcoholic

beverage, bloodshot glassy eyes, and he had urinated in his pants." (Prelim Tr., p.17,
Ls.4-16.)

Mr. Briggs refused to exit the vehicle and would not take a breath test.

(Prelim. Tr., p.17, L.20 - p.18, L.18.)

Officer Case then advised Mr. Briggs that he

would be taken for a blood draw. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.14-16.)
Officer Case testified as to Mr. Briggs' conduct while sitting in the back of the
patrol car after being informed he would be taken for a blood draw:
He wouldn't sit back in the seat. Laid there on the seat kicking at
us. We were able to catch his legs. He wouldn't fold them up so we could
close the door. I eventually had to hit him in the back of the knee to get
that leg to fold up, and we got that done, but as soon as I closed the door,
he pushed off of that door, stuck his head and shoulders off out the other
door and now the fight is on to try to get that door closed. Absolutely
refused to cooperate, just screaming, yelling, cussing, swearing. We
eventually managed to get him sitting up enough to close the door and
transported him to the EIRMC.
(Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Once officers arrived got to EIRMC, Mr. Briggs "refused to
exit the vehicle. We had to actually pull him out and put him face down on a gurney to
get him inside the hospital for the blood draw." (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Ultimately,

8

See footnote 7.
The 12/19/10 transcript of Mr. Briggs' preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim.
Tr.," for ease of reference.
9

26

once the phlebotomist arrived, Mr. Briggs had to be held down by five officers to
complete the blood draw. (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10.)
There is nothing in Officer Case's testimony that demonstrates there was a
compelling need for the immediate seizure of Mr. Briggs' blood, and no evidence that
the officers were unable to obtain a warrant. 10 In Idaho, warrants can be obtained
telephonically, which is presumably quicker than obtaining a warrant in person.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4404:
In lieu of a written affidavit, the magistrate may take an oral statement
under oath which shall be recorded and transcribed. The judge is
authorized to administer an oath or affirmation by telephone, and to take
testimony by telephone. All testimony given over the telephone that is
intended to support an application for a search warrant must be given on
oath or affirmation and must identify the person testifying. The affidavit or
oral testimony as recorded must be filed with the clerk of the court.
Thereafter, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4406:
If the affidavit for the warrant is related to the court telephonically, the
magistrate may verbally authorize a peace officer to sign the magistrate's
name on a duplicate original warrant, which verbal authorization shall be
recorded and transcribed. After service of the warrant, this duplicate
original warrant must be returned to the magistrate who authorized the
signing of his name on it. The magistrate shall then endorse his name and
enter the date on the warrant when it is returned to him. Any failure of the
magistrate to make such an endorsement does not in itself invalidate the
warrant.
Id.
Nothing in the testimony of Officer Case demonstrates that either made an effort
to obtain a warrant, or that they were otherwise unable to do so. Given the availability
of the telephonic warrant, it is particularly problematic that the troopers made no effort
whatsoever to obtain a warrant. Thus, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to

10

See Footnote 6.
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demonstrate exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. Accordingly, the
district court erred in denying Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the illegally obtained blood
evidence.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Briggs' Motion To Suppress The Results Of
The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances
Assuming arguendo that the forcible blood draw constitutes a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement, the forcible blood draw must still be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I section 13 of the
Idaho Constitution. In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society.
That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in
no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions.
384 U.S. at 772. The Supreme Court specifically stated that "[l]t would be a different
case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request to
undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force."
Id. at 760 n.4. The Supreme Court incorporated this Fourteenth Amendment analysis

into its discussion of the reasonableness requirement under its Fourth Amendment
analysis. Id. Even Idaho case law recognizes that when the warrantless search falls
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the search and seizure
must still be reasonable in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Diaz, 144 Idaho
at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.
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In this case, Mr. Briggs' forcible blood draw was unreasonable. As is set forth
above, Mr. Briggs repeatedly resisted all contact by officers, so much so Officer Case
struck Mr. Briggs in the back of his knee with his baton to get the doors of the police
cruiser shut. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Throughout the entire period, Mr. Briggs was
extremely hostile toward the officers.
arrived

(Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.)

Then, once they

to the EIRMC, Mr. Briggs refused to exit the vehicle and officers had to drag him

out of the police cruiser and place him face down on a gurney, all while Mr. Briggs
continued to threaten officers and hospital staff. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23, p.20, Ls.13.)

Then, it took five officers to hold Mr. Briggs down so the phlebotomist could

complete the blood draw. (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10; Tr., p.11, Ls.2-5, p.14, Ls.24-25.)
Mr. Briggs asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not authorize police in a
standard DUI to use five officers to force a suspect to hold still enough that a
phlebotomist could forcibly stick a needle in his arm to obtain blood. The Constitution
requires more. The Constitution requires reasonableness, and the forcible blood draw
here was unreasonable.

Mr. Briggs asks this Court to hold that the police officers'

conduct was unreasonable. The blood test violated Mr. Briggs' constitutional rights to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Briggs respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order denying
his motion to suppress.

DATED this 15 day of October, 2010. ~
th

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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